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1 InTRODuCTIOn
Throughout the 20th century, security in Serbia was comprehended main-
ly within a traditional and narrow concept of national security (state-cen-
tric), defined in military terms that highlight the use of power and related 
mechanisms. During the period of socialism (1945-1989), Serbia, as a 
constitutive republic of SFR Yugoslavia, emphasised the ideological com-
ponent of security.1 Party-state security was provided by the strong state 
aparatus such as the public and secret police which, under the Ministry of 
interior (MoI), held wide-ranging legal powers and often violated human 
rights as they were accountable only to the communist party. An attempt 
to socialise the security function through widening the scope of secu-
rity into a, “system of defence and social self-protection” (Milosavljević, 
1997:71) proved somewhat dysfunctional and eventually dissipated. How-
ever, crime rates were rather low and the security situation was stable due 
to a number of internal and external social and political conditions.
With the dissolution of the SFRY and the subsequent disintegration of the 
political system of socialist self-management, Serbia formally step into the 
multi-party system. However, in reality it was ruled by the Socialist party 
of Serbia, and by Slobodan Milošević as the inviolable leader of party and 
state. Democratic institutions (such as elections, parliament, courts and 
media) were rendered absurd.2 Due to the incompetent political leadership 
that lacked a sustainable strategy for state and society, coupled with their 
foreign policy, Serbia become isolated and was brought under the econom-
ic sanctions of the UN. Numerous economic (e.g. the highest historically-
1 The main values that had to be protected from a plethora of ‘domestic and foreign 
enemies’ were ideological: for example, the system of socialistic self-management, 
the brotherhood and unity of nations that lived in Yugoslavia and the non-aligement 
foreign policy. Securing them was the priority of the police and other agencies which 
controlled both media and citizens alike. 
2 The state (party-controlled) media were preparing the public for ‘free’ elections, and 
labelled the opposition parties as foreign spys, traitors and enemies. As the Albanians in 
Kosovo province did not vote, 30 out of 250 places in Parliament, were guaranteeed for 
the Socialist party of Serbia on the basis of votes of Serbs in the province that support-
ed Milosević. The police were engaged in counting the votes and organising elections. 
The result was that opposition in the Parliament was a pure fallacy, while parliamen-
tarian debates descended into hate speeches. Judges and prosecutors appointed by the 
Parliament followed not the rule of law, but the interests of ruling parties. During some 
court proceedings, members of the Serbian Radical Party drank beer in the courtroom, 
sang songs and made fun of the opposition in full view of the media. 
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recorded inflation), political and security problems have arisen. The country 
was faced with an enormous rise in both established forms of crime and 
new forms of crime like organised crime, war crimes and hate crimes. The 
state became both the organiser and the sponsor of excise crimes such as 
tobacco smuggling to finance its growing requirements. These crimes were 
organised by security agencies such as the secret police that, on an operative 
level, have engaged with major criminals. This rejection of the laws of the 
state, and of the wishes of business enterprises and members of the public, 
led to a growing isolation and sense of anomie. The police were the pillar of 
the regime, whose main task was not to serve and protect the people, but 
the political regime e.g. the ruling elite. Its main purpose was the fierce sup-
pression of democratic movements and the participation in the Yugoslav 
War,
 
while crime fighting and community policing were largely neglected. 
Many serious crimes remained unsolved and fear of crime amongst citizens 
was high. Some criminals were even protected, due to their actions in both 
the war and the smuggling operations of the state. Besides that, a number 
of high-ranking police officers and managers were involved in, or very close 
to, organised criminal groups. The police were also very forceful in inter-
ventions against political opponents of the regime, especially during street 
demonstrations. The police model become very centralised and militarised, 
which subsequently led to the introduction of a military ranking system for 
the police in 1995. Loyalty was ensured by direct appointments of politically 
obedient people to elite positions in the service.
The situation in Serbia culminated with the 1998-1999 Kosovo crises and 
the subsequent NATO military intervention, after the breakdown of ne-
gotiations in Rambuliet. Milošević was defeated in elections held in Sep-
tember 2000, and his attempt to falsify the results failed due to massive 
civil resistance that culminated in demonstrations of over 600,000 people 
in Belgrade on the 5th October 2000.
 
2 PuBLIC POLICInG – ThE COnCEPT OF POLICE REFORM 
In SERBIA
Bearing in mind the aforementioned features of the Serbian police and 
its role in maintaining an autocratic regime, police reform (and reform of 
the whole security sector as well) became the priority of the first demo-
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cratic government as a prerequisite for transition from an authoritarian to 
a democratic model.3 Cornerstone challenges of this reform were flagged 
as the four “Ds” – de-politicisation, de-centralisation, de-criminalisation 
and de-militarisation. 
The four “Ds” were the basis of the Vision Document that was produced 
between 2001 and 2003 by independent Serbian experts, experts from 
the Ministry of interior and from Lex/local NGO and foreign experts en-
gaged by the Danish institute for human rights as a strategic partner. In 
this comprehensive document (over 600 pages), the main directions of 
reform for all sectors of police work were defined, as well as indicators 
for measuring progress. In an appendix to the document, there was a 
catalogue with 174 different projects for potential donors.4 The Vision 
Document for the reform of the police service was presented to the pub-
lic in April 2003 and implementation of the reform document was the 
task of the MoI and the Government. The ‘Steering Committee’ for the 
reform process, chaired by the Minister, was supposed to “co-ordinate 
the completion of the Vision Document of the reform and elaborate a 
long-term reform strategy”.
 
However, this body has never met.
 
Neither 
did the new administration that came into power in early 2004 to reinvig-
orate the Committee. What occurred was a high turnover of police senior 
management at both national and local level.
 
The only government body 
in charge of police reform exists only on paper. In March 2003, Prime 
Minister Zoran Djindjić was assassinated, and a state of emergency was 
introduced. In 2004, the new cabinet of Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica 
was formed, and a new minister of interior was appointed. The new gov-
ernment and minister formally upheld the Vision Document.
On an operational level, the Djindjić Government (2001-2003) put for-
ward six priority areas of police reform: 
– Police Education and Development 
– Accountability (internal and external oversight) 
– Organised Crime 
3 There was a three-month interregnum in which democratic opposition shared power 
with Milošević’s party. That was the reason for delaying the beginning of the reform.
4 The Vision Document was not developed further in terms of detailed plans, time-
lines, specific milestones, realistic goals and practical steps to realise the vision of a 
new police service,
 
nor used as starting point for a new revised document. 
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– Forensics 
– Border Policing 
– Community Policing
After the elections in 2004, Koštunica’s Government added two more:
– War Crimes, and 
– Strategic Planning and Development. 
2.1 Main positive results 
We will discuss the main achieved results on strategic and operational level. 
2.1.1 Strategic Level 
Police reform was slow, as neither of the post-Milošević administrations 
had an overall reform strategy, which led to a lack of internal capacity 
and precise time-frames for steering towards the proclaimed goals. If the 
results are to be sustained a long-term home affairs strategy needs to be 
put in place (Bakić and Gajić, 2006: 3). Although the four “Ds” have often 
been publicly championed by both administrations since 2000, they were 
not systematically developed as government policy. Neither of the post-
Milošević governments adopted any overall strategy for the implementa-
tion of police reform.
 
So, on the strategic level, the main objective - four 
“Ds” were not achieved.
De-politicisation seems still to be a very distant ideal. Dušan Mihajlović, 
Minister of Interior in Djindjić’s government, declared that the police be-
came depoliticised when its symbols were changed (for example, its uni-
forms) and the secret police were no longer an organisational part of 
the MoI. However, the problem of politicisation of the police is not so 
simple. After the second democratic elections, over 600 police managers 
were replaced due to political reasons. Political influence over the police 
is sometimes unscrupulous.5 Although recent legislation (introduced to-
5 Aleksandar Nikitović, chief of cabinet of Prime Minister Koštunica ordered that Slo-           
bodan Jocić, commander of Sever police station in Belgrade, had to be relieved of his 
duty, after a policeman from this police station fined him for speeding late at night 
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wards the end of 2005) has made a nominal division between political 
and operational components, political influence is still overly present at 
all levels and the Minister of Interior is still seen as the top operational 
police officer. Goran Petrović, ex-chief of the State Security Sector, views 
ideas of professionalisation and depoliticisation, two pillars of the modern 
police, as abrogated with numerous solutions within the new legislation. 
The fact that the Director of the police is appointed by the Government on 
the proposal of the Minister, would be a small step towards his imaginary 
autonomy, if the Minister did not appoint almost all the other senior po-
lice managers, as is evidenced by a number of provisions. The Director is 
responsible for the work of the police, but has no managerial autonomy. 
That such powers are granted to a politician such as the Minister is contra-
dictory to ideas of professionalisation and depoliticisation. Furthermore, 
the fact that the Minister decides on the promotion of police staff, the 
deployment of special police units and is able to direct police investiga-
tions pending the public prosecutor being made aware of them highlights 
the fact that the political function is neither marginalised nor limited. On 
the contrary, the Minister is a despot with unlimited powers.6
In real terms, there has been no concerted move towards decentralisati-
on; the police service remains a centralised authority, reflecting the struc-
ture of the centralised state. Centralised management of the budget and 
short-term planning
 
have impeded the delegation of decisions and police 
officers at the local level have little freedom in addressing specific local is-
sues and working more closely with communities. This has also impacted 
upon the development of a coherent community safety agenda.
It is rather hard to estimate the amount of progress towards de-crimina-
lisation, due to a lack of data and an ineffective system of accountability. 
Some of the structural elements and causes of criminalisation are sup-
pressed, but there are still policeman that are very close to the ‘contro-
versial’ businessmen. It is not easy to estimate the level of corruption in 
the police, but, based on data about police salaries, and the estimations 
on the 10th July 2006. After the media showed interest in the case, the decision upon 
his relief was withdrawn, but charges against Nikitović were suspended. Source: daily 
newspaper Blic, 4-5, 12. Jul 2006.    
6 Glas javnosti 12th August 2006 taken from Nezavisne novine, Banja Luka.
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of overall level of corruption in Serbia,7 it might also be rather high. The 
Serbian police still have a long way to go in effecting de-criminalisation 
and progressing in the fight against corruption.
According to police officials, the Serbian police is now demilitarised as 
recent police legislation abolished military ranks in police, except in some 
special police unit (e.g. the Gendarmerie). But the key question is wheth-
er military logic and relations are still present within the Serbian police. 
Police officers still have very few discretionary powers and execute the 
commands of their superiors without question. Thus, the hierarchy is still 
premised upon a rigid superior-subordinate relationship, defined by pre-
rogatives of rank, where initiative is neither sought nor encouraged.
2.1.2 Operational Level 
The main achievement of the reform, within the declared priority areas, 
on the operational level are in the fields of organised crime, forensics and 
border policing.
In Serbia, at the beginning of the police reform process, there existed 
three police educational institutions – Police High School, Police College 
and Police Academy. These have traditionally functioned independently 
with no mechanisms for the integration of resources, a system which 
was both inefficient and expensive. Thus, there was no effective model 
of institutionalised police training. Teaching methodology was obsolete 
and ‘teacher-centred’ and curricula were outdated, theoretical and mili-
tarised. There was an evident lack of female and minority candidates and 
students. 
In 2005, with the assistance of foreign partners, a phased transformation 
of the Police High School8 into the entry-level Basic Police Training Centre 
7 According to the Transparency International Index, corruption in Serbia in 2005 was 
2.5 times higher than in all other ex-Yugoslav countries except Macedonia. See more 
on http://ww1.transparency.org./cpi/2005/dndl/news.
8 For more than 30 years this school enrolled 14 year old boys, educating them for 4 
years under a military-style regime of activities linked to basic police duties. Trans-
forming this institution took a long time partly due to the fact that a number old high 
ranking police officers had been students at this school and had certain sentiments 
towards the institution.
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was introduced, along with standardisation of basic police training. The 
MoI and OSCE initiated re-training of the teaching staff and the develop-
ment of a new curriculum. In late summer 2006, the amalgamation of 
the Police College and the Police Academy into a Police Faculty began. 
Under the adopted strategy, this institution was seen as a civil institution 
and part of Belgrade University, which had close links with MoI. In prac-
tice, the ‘new’ institution, the Criminalistics Police Academy (CPA), is still 
very much linked to the MoI and continues to be influenced by it in ways 
which impact upon its affiliation with the university.9 Changes to cur-
ricula and teaching methodology were more cosmetic than substantive.
The biggest positive innovation in terms of human resources develop-
ment and creating a representative police service was the inclusion of 
female uniformed police officers.10 
The MoI opened up to influx of training offers coming from different 
international organisations and individual donor countries.11 However, 
the training offered on a bilateral basis was arranged directly with differ-
ent MoI organisational units, and there was no systematic central record 
keeping. The common theme that connected all those courses was the 
obvious lack of sustainability. Further attention in the future will have to 
be given to specialised, in-service and advanced training entailing either 
the creation of new or the transformation of existing Training Centres to 
cover the whole of Serbia.12 
During the last decade of the 20th century the question of police acco-
untability was totally neglected. Due to the politicisation and criminalisa-
tion of the police it was very important to put this issue onto the reform 
agenda. In March 2001 an internal affairs unit, the Inspector General Of-
fice (IGO), was established as a part of the MoI. This is headed by the 
9 For example, the Minister of interior approves the Program of scientific researches 
of the Academy. Teachers have the same status as civilians in certain positions in the 
MoI, including rights and privileges (such as carrying weapons). 
10 Since starting in 2000 with only 29 female uniformed police officers,
 
the MoI has 
organised three basic police courses for female cadets. By the end of 2003, there were 
1,110 female uniformed police officers.
11 On the celebration of 1,000 days of the Government, Minister Mihajlović stated that 
10,000 police officers had attended more than fifty different courses and seminars.
12 According to the Strategy, the MoI needs to re-define the curricula for specialised 
training by October 2007.
88 Policing in Emerging Democracies – Critical Reflections
Inspector General who is an Assistant Minister of Interior and appointed 
by the government. IGO’s remit was to oversee the police, to ensure they 
acted in accordance with the law and code of ethics13 and to investigate 
citizens’ complaints against the police. The unit’s first task was to address 
allegations of crime, corruption and inappropriate behaviour by police. 
However, the first IG was appointed only two years later, and he assumed 
the Office without personnel, without office space and without any other 
resources. In the meantime, the Office existed only on paper. After the 
elections in 2004, this position was treated as part of a political bargain 
rather than a matter of professional competence. The IG was proposed by 
the Serbian Renewal Movement and there were, from time to time, cer-
tain tensions, and even public conflicts, between the IG and the Minister. 
The current IG was appointed to the position although he had no police 
experience at all and proceed to attracted media attention more on ac-
count of his glamorous life style than by his competency in the role. 
Under new legislation, internal police oversight is regulated, for the first 
time by law. The law established the Division of Internal Affairs which 
‘monitors’ the legality of police work, especially with regards to respect 
and protection of human rights. The Division is managed by the Division 
Head who regularly reports to the Minister of Interior. At the request of 
the government and the parliament, the Minister is required to submit a 
report on the work of the Division. Internal oversight of the police service 
still has a long way to go. 
External parliamentary oversight is still at a rudimentary stage. The Par-
liamentary Committee for Defence and Security – in charge of police 
oversight inter alia – is only formally performing its role, without showing 
any interest in deeper involvement. Its members generally do not pos-
sess sufficient knowledge of the area, and the Committee does not have 
sufficient professional expertise at its disposal. The idea of establishing 
an independent external oversight body has not been pursued, which re-
mains a substantial omission in the police oversight structure (Bakić and 
Gajić, 2006). 
During Milošević’s rule, the existence of organised crime in Serbia was 
officially negated. Although organised crime was widespread prior to the 
13 The Directive on Police Ethics was adopted in 2003. 
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1990s, its development to the current extent was a direct consequence 
of the wars in former Yugoslavia, the dissolution of the country and the 
UN economic embargo that encouraged the criminalisation of the entire 
society, including the police. 
The provisional government’s first response to organised crime was to in-
troduce POSKOK – an organisational unit of the MoI tasked with combat-
ing organised crime. It conducted a comprehensive crime-mapping survey 
for the White Book, but was disbanded in early 2001 impeding the practi-
cal application of its findings. POSKOK was replaced with the Organised 
Crime Directorate (UBPOK) as a stable structure external to the police 
service (Public Security Sector) that reported directly to the Minister of 
Interior.14 This unit attracted a lot of international attention and received 
donations of equipment and training. 
Organised crime inflicted several serious blows upon Serbia, the most 
important being the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjić, which was 
a direct consequence of the relationship between the security structures 
and organised crime. During the state of emergency that lasted 40 days, 
the MoI launched the massive police operation “Sabre” that dealt a severe 
blow to organised crime. However, post-Sabre calmness lasted for some 
two years, and following this period Serbian organised crime recovered. 
UBPOK has achieved some impressive results, but it could not have al-
ways met the high expectations of the public due, primarily, to the lack of 
proper co-operation within the criminal justice sector, e.g. inefficiency in 
the prosecution and judiciary. 
In 2005, UBPOK was integrated into the Criminal investigation depart-
ment - CID and renamed the Organised Crime Service (Služba za organi-
zovani kriminal – SOK).
 
Its internal structure did not change very much 
from UBPOK’s, with the exception of the War Crimes Department which 
has been removed to become the Service for War Crimes Investigation, 
but which retains the same hierarchical status as SOK. The aim of such 
reorganisation was not only the rationalisation and consolidation of the 
14 UBPOK was in 2003 also tasked with investigating war crimes, due to the connections 
of certain war criminals with organised crime and war profiteering.
 
The role of the 
War Crimes Department is especially important and sensitive bearing in mind the 
connection of certain police elements to war crimes.
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Serbian crime-fighting capacities, but also de-politicisation by taking all 
police units within the police service, out of direct political control. It yet 
remains to be seen and evaluated whether the restructuring will increase 
the police service’s effectiveness in combating organised crime.15
For more than a decade, the development of forensics and crime scene 
management capacities had been compromised. The Serbian police were 
using obsolete and inadequate equipment and techniques, and were there-
fore unable to produce evidence of sufficient quality to be used in court. 
Since 2000, with assistance from the international community, much 
has been achieved in upgrading the criminal-technical service within the 
CID. The focus has been on developing a quality management system 
for processing evidence and a coherent crime scene investigation policy. 
To this effect, we have witnessed the creation of a national centralised 
criminal-technical service, a regional network of forensic laboratories, the 
Automated Fingerprints Identification System (AFIS), the Face Identifica-
tion System (FIS), a national DNA laboratory and an enhancement of 
the skills and knowledge base amongst MoI staff. However, a challenge 
remains in the area of co-operation between the pillars of the criminal 
justice system.
In 2000, FRY Army and Navy were securing the FRY green and blue bor-
ders,
 
while the MoI’s of the constitutive republics (Serbia and Montene-
gro) were tasked with controlling border crossing points. Transferring re-
sponsibility for the task of border security from the military to the police 
was postponed due to conceptual problems regarding the state union of 
Serbia and Montenegro. So far, the necessary organisational, normative 
and other (e.g. HR) preconditions to assure this transition are present 
within MoI and demilitarisation of the state border began in 2005. Ac-
cording to arrangements, at the end of 2006 the police will take over 
responsibility for securing all the state borders. This has led to intensive 
activity surrounding the introduction of Integrated Border Management 
as one of the main preconditions for future EU accession.16
15 It should be mentioned that enhancing the fight against organised crime depends 
upon developing comprehensive systems of national criminal intelligence, forensics 
and border policing.
16 For more details see http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/upload/documents/strategy_
border%20eng.pdf.
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The MoI has developed a community policing agenda premised upon 
a bottom-up approach and implemented projects in several pilot sites
 
across Serbia in June 2003, in co-operation with international organisa-
tions and agencies. The plan was that the pilot project would last from 
three to five years, and that the MoI would create a national strategy prior 
to the development of a community policing model suitable for national 
roll-out. In late 2004 the results of these developments were published 
in the Joint Evaluation Report conducted by the Serbian MoI and the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID). It concluded that a 
great deal has been achieved, and that the piloting process has provided a 
strong foundation for further development and expansion to other parts 
of Serbia, but that there is still some way to go towards before the model 
might be considered sustainable.
Strategic planning has been the hallmark of police reform. Only recently 
have operational strategies been developed, and only after the realisa-
tion that the previously fragmented approach had led to disjointed and 
unsustainable developments. There were a small number of international 
and MoI efforts in the area of strategic planning,17 but a lack of political 
will and strategic thinking, coupled with personnel discontinuity, affected 
the possibilities for a sustainable development of existing achievements. 
A new MoI organisational chart displays the Bureau for Strategic Planning 
and Analytical Reporting within the minister’s cabinet, but this unit is still 
not operational.
In the overall context of reform, one substantial weakness is the person-
nel management of the police describe in the OSCE report as the Achilles’ 
heel of the system (Bakić and Gajić, 2006). 
Among other achievements the following should be mentioned: the reas-
sertion of international police cooperation, the creation of the Multi-Eth-
nic Police Element (MEPE) with the assistance of the international com-
munity and the extraction of the Security Information Agency (BIA)
 
in 
2002 from the MoI structure, and the re-positioning of it under the direct 
control of the government. 
17 For example, the work by the DCHR that led to the Vision Document and within the 
framework of the regional association Southeast European Police Chiefs Association 
(SEPCA) which was assisted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).
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2.2 Main Obstacles
In official presentations of the police reform process, representatives of 
the MoI have expressed their satisfaction with the achieved results.18 On 
the other hand, independent experts and journalists are rather disap-
pointed, paraphrasing the slogan of the disappointed supporters of the 
Milošević’s opposition, who believed that revolution occurred on the 5th 
October 2000, “Everything is the same, only he is missing”. Probably the 
truth is somewhere in the middle. The reformation of Serbian police has 
been revealed as a very difficult task. Any attempt to explain the some-
what limited result of six years of reform should take the following obsta-
cles into consideration: 
•	 During the period of provisional technical government, as a result of 
an apparent political agreement, the State Security Sector was left to 
be tackled by the new Serbian government. Accordingly, in this four-
month period of transitional government, there were no changes or 
any start of the reform process in that Sector.
•	 The lustration of the police service was not carried out;19 
•	 The DOS (Democratic opposition of Serbia) governing coalition was 
heterogeneous with strong internal rivalries which weakened the dem-
ocratic momentum. This also applies to Koštunica’s government that 
is in coalition with Milošević’s party. The consequence is the lack of a 
political will for real change;
•	 Political instability;20
•	 The assassination of Prime Minister Djindjić slowed the reform process;
•	 Amongst political actors in Serbia, the police are still comprehended as 
wielding power for their own purposes rather than for those of public 
service. 
18 For example, in the presentation of general M. Kuribak at the international confer-
ence Security sector reform in Serbia – Achievements and Prospects, organised by 
Center for military-civil relations, DCAF and Chech governemnt, 29th-31st October 
2006, Belgrade. 
19 There was no systematic review of the conduct of the police managers during the au-
thoritarian regime. Some of them who became infamous on account of their actions 
at that time are still in a high position due to the lack of mechanisms of lustration.
20 This led to indecision instead of timely action and change management. The sus-
tainable development of the service cannot be guaranteed when police officials are 
unwilling to apply for senior posts due to the possibility of being demoted for purely 
political reasons.
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3 PRIVATE POLICInG
Private policing is a relatively new phenomenon in the Serbian internal 
security system. The country experienced a sudden growth in the number 
of private security companies at the end of 1992, a development stimu-
lated by the abolition of the Law on social self-protection in 1993. This 
period signals the beginning of the private security sector in Serbia. From 
the beginning, the development of the private security sector was mov-
ing in two directions; (1) towards establishing private agencies that were 
engaged in protecting ‘new businessmen’, politicians, entertainment stars 
but also criminals and both former and current members of secret serv-
ices, and; (2) towards establishing private security companies that inher-
ited the role and jobs of former security services in public companies that 
were engaged in traditional jobs of securing property, people or business. 
While doing so, the agencies, as a rule, worked in an illegal and frequently 
unlawful manner, while private security companies, that could have even 
a larger number of employees, were slowly developing their field of activ-
ity and the private security sector in general. 
In a very short period of time, of about a decade, the number of employ-
ees in the private security sector came close to the number of employees 
in the police – around 30,000. The increase in the private security sector 
is a direct consequence of the change of regime following October 5th 
2000. The process of privatisation, and the arrival of foreign companies 
in the Serbian market, has led to an increase in the quality and extent of 
supply in the private security market in Serbia. This rise in the Serbian 
private security industry is confirmed by data that suggests that the yearly 
turnover of private security companies increased from EUR 10 million in 
2001 to approximately EUR 26 million in 2003 (according to official data 
of the NBS Solvency Centre). Investment by private security companies’ 
owners have tended to be directed towards new security technologies and 
equipment, rather than employee training and education.
Since the beginning of the development of the private security sector, 
however, there has been a chronic absence of legal regulation. Despite 
the fact that several valid laws indirectly regulate the framework and the 
character of the private security field, a separate law on private security 
would largely prevent serious problems that this sector faces. In the con-
text of this work, these problems are also shown as its main challenges.
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In the analytical sense, we believe, the general problem which the private 
security sector of Serbia is facing is the ability to shape it, build it and 
harmonise it with the European model of private policing. 
Putting the problem in such a broad perspective, requires the identifica-
tion of specific problems which affect, with varying intensity, the chal-
lenges faced:
•	 The absence of a relevant contemporary categorical apparatus in the 
field of internal security, which results from the fact that in Serbia there 
is no clearly formulated national security concept based primarily on 
prevention (not repression). The character/course of historical change 
suggests that the social corpus is increasingly becoming characterised 
in terms of the private. 
•	 A connected issue is that this absence of a conceptual apparatus ne-
gates the possibility of an analytic framework from which to engage 
with critical opinion, conceptualisation and strategic planning.
•	 There is a lack of legislation with which to regulate the number of 
negative, or at least undefined occurrences, that occur in the private 
security sector - e.g. with regard to private investigators/detectives, 
private surveillance systems and abuse by private security, the lack of 
regulation of tendering private security services, the lack of systematic 
training and education of employees, the licensing of companies and 
employees in the sector, the protection of employees’ rights and illegal 
competition in the security services market.
•	 There is a lack of partnership between the private and state security 
sectors, which is a key precondition for ensuring the security and safety 
of citizens, the local community and society in general. This provides 
illumination in two main ways; (1) the governing model of internal 
security in Serbia is one of state-centralisation, and, in relation to this; 
(2) there is evidence of a persistent stereotype that holds the police as 
the only performer of security in society. 
•	 There is a lack of any conception of crime prevention, at the national 
level, and therefore a lack of any vision about the place and the role of 
the private sector in prevention. 
The last problem directly takes us to the discussion about the extent to 
which we can talk about private policing in Serbia at all. If we strictly 
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adhere to the definition of policing21 as a social concept that involves a 
wider circle of social factors involved in the maintenance of social order, 
then we can say that we are in the initial stages of creating conditions for 
the establishment of a private policing model.
At the same time, the private security sector as an integral part of policing 
is suffering from a lack of legal regulation, standardisation and profes-
sionalisation. In the last six years we have noticed only one attempt made 
by the MoI in the early phase of police reform to regulate this sector. It 
was a law draft made in 2002 which is still on the `waiting list` to enter 
the Serbian Parliament. Since then, all activities towards regulation of the 
sector have halted. Research results show us rather dramatic situations in 
terms of; (1) a lack of standards in performing private security services; 
(2) a lack of training courses for employees in private security companies; 
(3) a lack of regulation imposed upon the private security market; (4) the 
existence of strong political influences on tenders for the outsourcing of 
security services; (5) a lack of communication and cooperation between 
public and private security sectors. It appears that the MoI and Serbian 
authorities are torn between competing demands to re-define and organ-
ize modern policing, on the one hand, and demands to preserve the status 
quo, on the other. 
The concept of policing, in actual fact, represents a socialisation of the 
function of security. The concept has historical precedent within Serbia 
and for two decades we witnessed the system of social self-protection, the 
process of socialising the function of security against a strong ideologi-
cal backdrop. Nevertheless, the huge social experience derived from the 
21 In essence, policing represents a social function that contributes to the maintenance 
of individual social order (and peace), which is carried out by numerous institutions, 
establishments and bodies. It is understood in terms of those activities the goal of 
which is to provide security in a certain environment, and this by way of measures 
and activities that are appropriate for such an objective. In that sense, policing differs 
from the much wider concept of social control, which includes almost everything 
that indirectly and directly contributes to maintenance, i.e. production of social order 
(and peace) – of schools, parent boards, churches, youth clubs and centres, media 
and public workers. In other words, policing is one aspect of social control that brings 
together monitoring systems with the threat of sanctions for violating social order, 
with its primary goal being to keep this social order safe from internal and external 
threats. This social order can be founded on consensus, or conflict and oppression, or 
a combination of the two, which occurs more frequently in modern societies. 
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practice of social self-protection could and should be used in organising 
the emergent concept of modern policing in Serbia.
The private security industry, despite the presence of unresolved prob-
lems, is entirely ready to integrate itself into such a concept. These prob-
lems can be easily and efficiently removed by way of proclaiming and re-
alizing several principles; (1) the principle of legalisation (2) the principle 
of professionalisation; (3) the principle of standardisation and (4) and the 
principle of europeisation. 
3.1 Development
The private security sector in Serbia is undeniably a reality as is the public/
state sector. What has yet to become a reality is communication between 
these two poles, cooperation on the general concept of crime prevention, 
the removal of the threat of crime and the elimination of the fear of crime 
that we have suffered for the past decade. However, at the same time, the 
private security sector represents an existing force that, with the expan-
sion of its activities, will gradually increase in power, and subsequently 
find itself in a different negotiating position. In contrast, the relinquishing 
of traditional jobs and authority that have characterised the state-exclu-
sive monopoly for centuries also represents a measure of democratisation 
of a society. Judging by the present situation, and the activities carried out 
by the security sector and the authority they continue to hold, the mo-
nopoly of state power embodied in the Ministry of Interior still exists.  
Perhaps it would be more precise to say that a large discrepancy exists be-
tween the proclaimed reform orientations of the Mol and what has actu-
ally been achieved in that sphere and the extent of adjustment to market 
laws and private security sector models of development. I will give an 
example of the way this sector reacts to the problem of legislative regula-
tion of private security. Even though the lack of legal regulation in this 
field suited many (generally smaller) private security companies for quite 
some time, the past five years have seen the entire private sector publicly 
insist on the necessity to pass the law. After failing to prove receptive to 
such requests, there was a growing awareness of the fact that private 
security was becoming international, and that leading private companies 
were establishing associations and on the threshold of being accepted to 
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CoESS (European Confederation of Private Security Services). Central to 
this was a desire to standardise and professionalise their practice accord-
ing to the European model and its associated market.
There are many examples of attempts by private security companies to 
enhance the professional level of their personnel, by hiring renowned 
scientific and qualified institutions, by investing substantial funds in the 
state-of-the-art equipment and by establishing cooperation with other 
companies in the region. 
All these are indicators of an absurd situation in which the social practice 
of private policing comes before social regulation in terms of norms and 
legislation. The majority of private security companies have certified their 
work according to ISO standards for commercial practice. Even though 
this is not a standard that refers solely to the field of security, this data in-
dicates how seriously and professionally private security companies wish 
to do their job. 
In relation to the development of private policing in Serbia, we can con-
clude that adopting a special law on private security is conditio sine qua 
non for the prevailing challenges within private security. 
The specific characteristics of conditions under which we make an appeal 
for placing the private security sector under legal regulation is reflected in 
the fact that aspirations to EU accession oblige us to harmonise the laws 
in this field with those in force in the EU member-countries. This means 
that we will no longer be directly dependant upon the will of parliamen-
tary session to adopt or not adopt a law, depending on their assessment 
of priority and which political party supplied the Ministry of interior.
We will depend exclusively on; (1) our qualifications and capability to 
join the European security community that, as far back as four years ago, 
signed the Joint Declaration on European harmonisation of laws that reg-
ulate the sector of private security; (2) the reform potential of the MoI 
that represents the basic precondition for establishing the partnership be-
tween these two sectors and finally; (3) strategic reform-based projects 
that would, according to the principle of horizontal coordination and ver-
tical integration, compose a more modern and functional concept of the 
internal security system. 
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4 COnCLuSIOn
Serbia’s police service still requires substantial and fundamental efforts to 
replace the old police culture with values that are in accordance with the 
changing social values of a society that is in transition and which is striv-
ing towards membership of the EU. The lack of legal instruments compat-
ible with European standards and best practices also hinders the reform 
process. The slow pace of implementation of the newly-adopted system is 
a considerable problem in many areas, and police reform is no exception. 
Speeding up the reform process is of utmost importance, bearing in mind 
regional security challenges, but further development will depend heavily 
on the political process.
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